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The Canon Wars 
Anita S. Krishnakumar* and Victoria F. Nourse** 
Canons are taking their turn down the academic runway in ways that no 
one would have foretold just a decade ago. Affection for canons of construction 
has taken center stage in recent Supreme Court cases1 and in constitutional 
theory. Harvard Dean John Manning and originalists Will Baude and Stephen 
Sachs have all suggested that principles of “ordinary 
interpretation”2⎯including canons3⎯should inform constitutional 
interpretation. Given this newfound enthusiasm for canons, and their 
convergence in both constitutional and statutory law, it is not surprising that we 
now have two competing book-length treatments of the canons—one by Justice 
Scalia and Bryan Garner, Reading Law, and the other by Yale Law Professor 
William N. Eskridge, Interpreting Law. Both volumes purport to provide ways to 
use canons to read statutes and the Constitution.  In this Review of Interpreting 
Law, we argue that this contemporary convergence on canons raises some 
significant interpretive questions about judicial power and the very idea of a 
canon. 
  
 
 * Mary C. Daly Professor of Law, St. John’s University School of Law. J.D., Yale Law School, 
1999; A.B., with distinction, Phi Beta Kappa, Stanford University, 1996. We owe deep thanks to 
Aaron-Andrew Bruhl, William N. Eskridge Jr., and Kate Shaw for valuable comments on earlier 
versions of this Review. Special thanks also to Dean Michael A. Simons and St. John’s Law School 
for generous research support.  All errors are our own. 
 ** Jack N. Pritzker Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law, Northwestern University (2017–
2018); Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. J.D., University of California, Berkeley 
School of Law, Order of the Coif, 1984; B.A., Stanford University, Phi Beta Kappa, 1980. 
1. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576 (2008) (employing the ordinary 
meaning canon—the maxim that the Constitution’s words ought to be given their normal and 
ordinary meaning). 
2. Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The Protean Take Care Clause, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 
1835, 1859–60 (2016) (using interpretive canons such as “expressio unius” to interpret the 
Constitution); John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 1939, 2015, 2025–38 (2011) (applying various “rules of construction” to interpret the 
Constitution’s vesting clauses). 
3. See generally William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. 
REV. 1079 (2017) (analyzing at length the canons as part of the “law of interpretation”). 
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Introduction 
What counts as a “canon” of statutory interpretation?  Is any interpretive 
principle articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court a canon? Or does canonical 
status require something more in the way of historical pedigree, longevity, 
regularity of use, or some other measure? Can and should all interpretive 
tools, including legislative history, statutory precedents, and administrative 
agency interpretations, be considered part of the canon—or are these separate 
resources standing apart from, and perhaps in hierarchical tension with, the 
canons of construction per se? 
These are just some of the fascinating questions raised by Bill 
Eskridge’s new book, Interpreting Law: A Primer on How to Read Statutes 
and the Constitution.4 Styled as a treatise, the book is, like all Eskridgean 
work, a delight to read. Eskridge puts what he calls “the gentle reader” 
through her interpretive paces, asking her to apply the hypothetical “No 
Vehicles in the Park” statute to a variety of vehicular items—from an 1897 
Léon Bollée Voiturette to a Bock Otto SuperFour Motorized Wheelchair.5 
The reader-friendly veneer is fitting, as the book is labeled a “primer” for 
students, scholars, lawyers, and judges. Eskridge’s chief goal is to offer a 
robust and important alternative to the late Justice Antonin Scalia and 
Professor Bryan A. Garner’s treatise-like tome on statutory interpretation, 
Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts.6 Even the names of the two 
books are—intentionally, we think—similar. 
 
 
4. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ STATUTES 
AND THE CONSTITUTION (2016) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE, INTERPRETING LAW]. 
5. Id. at 33–34, 133–34. 
6. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL 
TEXTS (2012). 
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I.   Theories of the Canons: Static v. Dynamic 
If the names of the books are similar, the implied—and sometimes 
express—theories of canons reflected therein are distinctly different. Scalia 
and Garner’s Reading Law offers fifty-seven valid canons that it urges 
“provide greater certainty in the law, and hence greater predictability and 
greater respect for the rule of law”7 by focusing on the statute’s text.8 By 
contrast, Eskridge’s Interpreting Law eschews the idea that a handful of 
canons applied mechanically can provide a complete answer to the 
interpretive questions at issue in a case.9 Eskridge makes a significant bow to 
text,10 insisting that the foundation of interpretation includes ordinary 
meaning, but the implicit theory of canons the book produces is overtly 
dynamic—as one might expect from the author of Dynamic Statutory 
Interpretation.11 To Eskridge, canons are a regime, a regime that is inherently 
normative and nonmechanical and likely to change over time. 
Interpreting Law is an incredibly rich and illuminating contribution to 
the fields of statutory and constitutional interpretation.12 Eskridge’s 
encyclopedic knowledge of the fields is revealed in his treatment of 
numerous interpretive canons and his nuanced, honest discussions about the 
advantages, disadvantages, and intricacies confronted in applying each of the 
canons he presents. He gives texture to a vast array of canons that textualists 
hold dear, emphasizing the importance of ordinary meaning among many 
other textual canons. Unlike the more dogmatic Justice Scalia volume, 
however, Eskridge gives us both sides of the debate. For example, consider 
the question of dictionary usage. Eskridge is admirably restrained. He knows 
that despite judicial enthusiasm for the practice, linguists find dictionary 
usage entirely unhelpful because the meanings in dictionaries are 
 
7. Id. at xxix. 
8. See id. at 343–46, 369–90 (discussing the false notions that “the spirit of a statute should 
prevail over its letter” and that “committee reports and floor speeches are worthwhile aids in 
statutory construction”). 
9. See ESKRIDGE, INTERPRETING LAW, supra note 4, at 9 (“Text and purpose are like the two 
blades of a scissors; neither does the job without the operation of the other. More important, 
statutory text and legislative purpose do not exhaust the context that is relevant for the proper 
application of statutes.”); id. (arguing, as an example, that “the rule of law requires the judge to 
consider practice and precedent before she confidently declares statutory meaning”); id. at 23 (“Any 
accurate description of statutory practice ought to include ordinary meaning, the whole statute and 
related statutes, statutory precedents, legislative history, administrative constructions, and 
constitutional and other background norms as relevant factors to consider.”). 
10. Id. at 40–41 (asserting that the ordinary meaning of a statute should be “the anchor for 
statutory interpretation by judges”). 
11. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994). 
12. Cf. ESKRIDGE, INTERPRETING LAW, supra note 4, at 10–11 (commenting that Justice 
Scalia’s judicial opinions “devoted many more pages of analysis to precedent and practice than to 
plain meaning”). 
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acontextual.13 So, he proposes a helpful amendment to allow for use of 
dictionaries to limit, rather than determine, meaning and goes on to ask 
various questions about the canon’s scope.14 Such a style is dramatically 
different from Scalia and Garner’s more rigid approach and appears 
throughout Eskridge’s volume, as he thoughtfully considers and interrogates 
a broad range of textual and substantive canons in both statutory and 
constitutional interpretation. 
The bottom line is this: even if you are interested in only the 
conventional textual canons emphasized by Justice Scalia, you should read 
Eskridge’s treatise. Like treatises generally should do, Eskridge’s treatise 
gives you a balanced view of the limits and advantages of the canons, along 
with reams of citations. Although a pragmatist himself, Eskridge 
comprehensively explains and treats with respect the ordinary meaning 
canon, the rule of the last antecedent, the canon of negative implication, and 
the whole act canon, among other textualist favorites.15 What is more, in 
addition to the conventional textual canons discussed by Justice Scalia, 
Eskridge’s volume also addresses substantive issues about which he and 
Justice Scalia disagree—such as Justice Scalia’s dynamic anticanon against 
legislative history16 and his rejection of the ancient Blackstonian rule against 
considering absurd consequences in statutory interpretation.17 At each turn, 
Interpreting Law expands our knowledge about canons, evaluating the 
tradeoffs in terms of stability, predictability, and democratic accountability.18 
Many devotees of the Scalia–Garner treatise will find (no doubt to their 
surprise) that Eskridge agrees with Scalia and Garner on such things as the 
fact that some canons can have a stabilizing effect. 
However balanced, readers familiar with the canon literature will note 
some Eskridgean canons that will strike them as new or strange. (To be fair, 
this is also true of some of the canons and anticanons in Justice Scalia’s 
book.) This is, in part, because Eskridge’s account of canons in Interpreting 
Law repurposes several traditional statutory interpretation tools as canons—
 
13.  See id. at 57–58 (noting that linguists are critical of judicial decisions that quote a dictionary 
definition and describing the importance of context). 
14. See id. at 59 (“[D]ictionaries are often useful in clarifying or narrowing our understanding 
of statutory terms.”). 
15. See id. at 33–55, 67–68, 78–81, 102–17 (providing thorough explanations of the various 
canons). 
16. As explained infra pp. 119–21, we call this anticanon “dynamic” because it reflects the way 
Justice Scalia believes legislative history should be treated, not the way the vast majority of courts 
currently treat it. 
17. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 6, at 234–38 (2012) (proposing that limiting conditions 
must be used when applying the absurdity doctrine so as to limit judicial revision of the text). 
18. See ESKRIDGE, INTERPRETING LAW, supra note 4, at 160–62 (observing how precedent and 
the order of litigation impact predictability and democratic accountability). 
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including legislative history,19 statutory precedents,20 and standards 
governing deference to administrative interpretations.21 This raises important 
methodological concerns for us. As we argue in the next Part, it creates a 
substantive ordering problem because, in our view, precedent and legislative 
history should take precedence over rules like noscitur a sociis. For this Part, 
however, the point is that Eskridge’s implied theory of canons is highly 
dynamic—it is not limited to the canons we know existed at the Founding; it 
is not limited to the traditional textual canons; rather, it includes ideas found 
in modern cases, ideas embraced by the law professoriate, and in some cases, 
ideas that are simply aspirational.22  
In many ways, this more dynamic view reflects reality: the Supreme 
Court has in the past twenty-five years embraced a variety of new substantive 
canons. The Scalia–Garner treatise is dynamic as well; it may focus on text, 
but it includes interpretive rules that few would describe as canons as 
opposed to judicial doctrines, like rules about preemption and implied rights 
of action. Moreover, the Scalia–Garner treatise goes out of its way to thumb 
its nose at canons that one might think well-established: rejecting the notion 
that remedial statutes are to be interpreted liberally and the idea that the 
“purpose of interpretation is to discover intent.”23 On these and other matters, 
Professor Eskridge’s treatise is in some respects more traditional than Justice 
Scalia’s. In fact, one way to look at Eskridge’s treatise is as a dynamic 
response to Justice Scalia’s own dynamism. In our view, Eskridge was right 
when he criticized Scalia and Garner’s Reading Law as picking and choosing 
the authors’ favorite canons.24 In some cases, Eskridge has replied with his 
own countercanons.25 The difference is that Eskridge openly admits that he 
is not describing a static world. 
All of this raises the central question of this Review: What counts as a 
canon of construction? This is a notoriously unresolved question in statutory 
and constitutional theory, one that Eskridge himself highlighted in a review 
 
19. See id. at 240–45 (describing, for example, a “Committee Report Canon”). 
20. See id. at 174–76 (describing, for example, a “Canon of Relaxed Stare Decisis for Common 
Law Statutes”). 
21. See id. at 299–301 (describing, for example, a “Curtiss-Wright Super-Deference Canon”). 
22. See discussion infra subparts II(A)–(C). 
23. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 6, at 364–66 (arguing against the liberal construction of 
remedial statutes because of the difficulty in determining what constitutes a remedial statute and 
what constitutes liberal construction); id. at 391–96 (arguing that “further uses of intent in questions 
of legal interpretation [should] be abandoned”). 
24. See William N. Eskridge Jr., The New Textualism and Normative Canons, 113 COLUM. L. 
REV. 531, 535–36 (2013) (reviewing SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 6) (arguing that Scalia and 
Garner’s attempt to set forth a collection of “valid canons” of statutory construction was 
unsuccessful). 
25. See id. at 541–42 (discussing certain canons not analyzed by Scalia and Garner, such as the 
stare decisis canon). 
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he wrote of Reading Law shortly after it was published.26 Interpreting Law 
never directly tackles this question, but its own capacious list of canons 
contains an implicit answer. That answer appears to be that a canon is any 
judicial principle or method of reasoning that the Supreme Court can use, 
should use, or has used (even once) in construing a statute. 
This implicit definition makes sense given Eskridge’s project of 
recording in one place all of the interpretive rules the Court has used—
particularly in a universe in which no established consensus exists regarding 
the criteria for achieving canon status.27 We nevertheless resist a super-
dynamic-canon theory on the ground that “any interpretive rule or method of 
reasoning” is simply too capacious a definition. We are worried that the 
“dynamic canon” theory elides important distinctions and fails to answer 
basic questions. First, the definition ignores important differences between 
language and substantive canons, which we believe should be treated 
separately rather than lumped together under a universal umbrella. Second, 
the dynamic definition papers over crucial questions about the role of canons 
in statutory interpretation more generally, such as: Have canons now 
subsumed all interpretation or, as we believe, do they play a subsidiary role?  
How do we know a real canon when we see one?  And so on. 
After exploring such questions in some detail, we propose our own 
preliminary answers in the Parts that follow. 
II.   An Ordering Problem 
Eskridge begins the volume with a healthy moderation in the great 
canon debates. He rejects the realist but cynical Llewellyn view that the 
canons are mere window-dressing as well as the formalist view that canons 
are rule-like: 
A thesis of this volume is that the canons are neither mechanical rules 
that by their own force assure the rule of law or democratic 
accountability or good governance, nor cynical instruments for result-
oriented judges to decorate judicial opinions like ornaments on a 
Christmas tree. Rather, the canons constitute an interpretive regime, 
namely, a set of conventional considerations relevant to statutory 
interpretation that ought to be laid out systematically in one volume 
 
26. See id. at 541 (focusing specifically on the question of what rules are “canonical”). 
27. Indeed, one of us has followed a similar, only slightly less capacious, definition in previous 
work. See Anita S. Krishnakumar, Statutory Interpretation in the Roberts Court’s First Era: An 
Empirical and Doctrinal Analysis, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 221, 240 (2010) [hereinafter Krishnakumar, 
Roberts Court First Era] (defining substantive canons as “interpretive presumptions and rules based 
on background legal norms, policies, and conventions”); see also Anita S. Krishnakumar, 
Reconsidering Substantive Canons, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 825, 855–57, 857 n.148 (2017) [hereinafter 
Krishnakumar, Reconsidering] (comparing Krishnakumar’s versus Eskridge and Frickey’s 
definitions of substantive canons in empirical work measuring the Court’s reliance on such canons). 
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available to students, attorneys, judges, agencies, and legislative 
drafting offices.28 
We admire this moderation but worry about the idea of an “interpretive 
regime.” The term “regime” suggests a consistency, force, and primacy that 
the canons do not exhibit.29 In our view, the canons do not constitute an 
interpretive regime but, rather, are one type of interpretive resource—a set of 
judicial assumptions and presumptions—that can guide statutory 
interpretation when other, more authoritative, interpretive resources fail to 
fill a gap or render clarity illusory. Canons generally should be a last resort, 
not a first one. Why? Because, as a general rule, canons are judicial 
assumptions about meaning—default rules. Default rules are second-best 
guesses or policies that apply when all first-best evidence fails. 
In other words, the ordering problem is this: By treating legislative 
history, precedent, administrative practice, and other interpretive resources 
as canons, Interpreting Law inadvertently (we think) places them on the same 
level in the hierarchy of interpretive tools as judicially created maxims, such 
as the presumption that tax statutes should be narrowly construed or that all 
statutes should be construed to avoid redundancy. But that is not how judges 
should—or in practice actually do—treat precedent, administrative practice, 
and legislative history when construing statutes. At various points, Eskridge 
appears to recognize that statutory interpretation is rife with ordering 
problems.30 He argues that some materials take precedence over others.31 
Precedents should control against a new plain meaning analysis.32 And judges 
should “consider relevant legislative history even if the judge believes there 
is or might be an ordinary or plain meaning.”33 At the same time, however, 
he treats stare decisis, legislative history, and administrative constructions in 
rhetorical ways—i.e., calling them canons—that suggest that these materials 
are on a par with other more well-known canons. 
 
 
 
 
28. ESKRIDGE, INTERPRETING LAW, supra note 4, at 20. 
29. See Nina A. Mendelson, Change, Creation, and Unpredictability in Statutory 
Interpretation: Interpretive Canon Use in the Roberts Court’s First Decade, 117 MICH. L. REV. 71 
(2018) (citing data from the Roberts Court’s first ten terms showing that judicial canon use is 
unpredictable and ever-changing). 
30. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, INTERPRETING LAW, supra note 4, at 141 (exemplifying the ordering 
problem through interpretation of the Park Safety Act). 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 202. 
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A.  The Canonization of Precedent, Legislative Evidence, and 
Administrative Interpretations 
 
First, consider Interpreting Law’s treatment of precedent. Eskridge is a 
huge fan of precedential forces in statutory interpretation, explaining that 
“adherence to stare decisis ‘marks an essential difference between statutory 
interpretation on the one hand and [common] law and constitutional 
interpretation on the other.’”34 In the next sentence, however, he equates this 
principle with traditional canons of construction: “Like the ordinary meaning 
rule and the whole act rule, this super-strong presumption of correctness for 
statutory precedents purports to be a foundation for the application of federal 
statutes . . . .”35 Eskridge goes on to build up a hefty subset of stare decisis 
canons: a canon of relaxed stare decisis for common law statutes; an 
“acquiescence” canon for legislative acquiescence to a judicial 
determination; and a “reenactment” canon for judicial interpretations 
Congress reenacts.36 Other “precedent-based canons”37 include a canon for 
judicial interpretation of common law “terms of art,” a canon for statutes that 
borrow from other acts (what Eskridge charmingly dubs stare de statute, 
following Frank Horack),38 and the “shadow precedents canon” (which we 
discuss in more detail below).39 
Now consider the book’s treatment of legislative history. Compared to 
stare decisis, Eskridge is not as enthusiastic about legislative history (or what 
one of us calls “legislative evidence”),40 but he seems very enthusiastic about 
canonizing the approaches he recommends (including the recommendations 
of one of the authors of this Review). For example, he offers up the 
“committee report canon,” which notes that House and Senate committee 
reports and explanations of the conferees are considered the most reliable and 
authoritative form of legislative history; the “sponsor’s statement canon,” 
which explains that the Supreme Court routinely considers statements made 
by the sponsor of the statute when relevant to the statutory question at issue; 
and the “subsequent legislative history canon,” which recognizes that the 
 
34. Id. at 163 (quoting Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 15 U. CHI. L. REV. 
501, 540 (1948)). 
35. Id. 
36. See id. at 174–76 (discussing the canon of relaxed stare decisis for common law statutes); 
id. at 176–77 (discussing the acquiescence canon for cases in which Congress does not act); id. at 
177–79 (discussing the reenactment canon for cases in which Congress reenacts a statute). 
37. Id. at 179 (discussing other precedent-based canons beyond strict stare decisis). 
38. Id. at 182 (citing Frank E. Horack Jr., The Common Law of Legislation, 23 IOWA L. REV. 
41 (1937)). 
39. Id. at 180–82 (discussing a common law canon for terms of art); id. at 182–85 (discussing 
a borrowed act canon); id. at 185–86 (discussing a shadow precedents canon). 
40. See VICTORIA NOURSE, MISREADING LAW, MISREADING DEMOCRACY 153 (2016) 
(referring to legislative history as “legislative evidence”). 
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“current federal judicial understanding is that subsequent legislative history 
is generally not a reliable source for statutory meaning”—although Eskridge 
argues that courts should consider this form of legislative history.41 Eskridge 
also recommends as canons interpretive rules advocated by one of us in a law 
review article, including a “backwards induction canon,” which reads 
legislative evidence from the last point of legislative decision rather than 
requiring a full-scale, front-forward history; the “rules of proceedings 
canon,” which holds that in cases of doubt Congress should resolve the doubt 
as would the rules of the House and the Senate; and the “sore losers canon,” 
which would bar the judiciary from citing legislative materials created by 
those who lost the vote, except in limited circumstances.42 
Canonization continues in the area of deference to administrative 
interpretations of statutes. As Eskridge rightfully acknowledges, “the 
overwhelming weight of official statutory interpretation is by administrators 
and agencies, not by judges.”43 This is an exceedingly important point and 
one that Justice Gorsuch’s recent confirmation hearings put into the spotlight 
given his concerns about Chevron deference.44 Here, what most 
conventionally know as precedents are dubbed canons. There is the 
“Skidmore Canon” on the interpretive value of regulatory history and the 
“Chevron Rule” on judicial deference to agency lawmaking.45 Under 
Chevron, Interpreting Law offers up the “Major Questions Canon,” the 
“Plain Meaning Rule (Chevron Step One),” the “Brand X Canon (Chevron 
Step Two),” and other deference canons, including the “Seminole Rock/Auer 
Canon” and the “Curtiss-Wright Super-Deference Canon.”46 This may be a 
rhetorical tic, or a strategy to rebut Reading Law’s own lengthy list of fifty-
seven canons (with its own imaginative use of the canon label), but, in the 
end, Interpreting Law leaves the impression of canons, canons everywhere. 
 
41. ESKRIDGE, INTERPRETING LAW, supra note 4, at 240–48, 251–54. 
42. Id. at 224–37.  Given that one of us is the author of these putative canons, see Victoria F. 
Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative History by the Rules, 122 YALE 
L.J. 70 (2012), it seems distinctly ungracious to decline canonization, if by canonization one means 
something sacred. Our point is that canonization has the potential to reduce the importance of a 
principle that should take priority. 
43. ESKRIDGE, INTERPRETING LAW, supra note 4, at 259. 
44. See Ilya Somin, Gorsuch Is Right About Chevron Deference, WASH. POST: VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (Mar. 25, 2017), https://washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017 
/03/25/gorsuch-is-right-about-chevron-deference/ [https://perma.cc/P9FM-TBA4] (highlighting 
public interest in Justice Gorsuch’s opinions regarding Chevron deference); see also Gutierrez-
Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (articulating 
Justice Gorsuch’s opposition to Chevron deference). 
45. ESKRIDGE, INTERPRETING LAW, supra note 4, at 269, 278. 
46. Id. at 287–301. 
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B.   Interpretive Priority 
Now that we have seen the tendency of the book to canonize a wide 
variety of precedents, practices, and materials, it is possible to consider in 
greater detail what we mean by the ordering problem. We begin with a 
hypothetical we hope will illustrate the problem. Eskridge is known for his 
amusing and illuminating hypotheticals, so we respond in kind. The basic 
idea of the “garbled order” was first deployed by Judge Posner.47 
Imagine soldier Bill searching for the meaning of a garbled order from 
General Dick.48 Soldier Bill cannot hear the precise order but knows that he 
must decide whether to attack or retreat. Imagine that there is a norm among 
soldiers that one is a coward if one does not attack, known informally as the 
“Tally Ho” canon. As soldier Bill is pondering the garbled command, 
General Dick’s aide Colonel Victoria, who drafted the original order, appears 
at soldier Bill’s side telling him that General Dick ordered retreat. Would a 
rational soldier attack? Would he tell Colonel Victoria to bug off, because 
the Tally Ho canon controls? Now assume the General’s aide is nowhere to 
be found, but soldier Bill remembers a similar battle days earlier when 
General Dick’s order was clear: attack only when fired upon. It seems highly 
doubtful that soldier Bill would ignore that precedent and proceed willy-nilly 
forward, raising the Tally Ho flag and attacking without a shot fired. 
If these intuitions are sound, then we can begin to see why over-
canonization raises interpretive problems. By suggesting that legislative 
history and precedent amount to canons, Interpreting Law essentially assigns 
them the same authoritative value as more conventionally understood 
canons—like noscitur a sociis or the presumption against extraterritorial 
application. As a result, we may have no way of distinguishing actual 
evidence of meaning from informed estimates or sheer guesses about 
meaning. Taken to its extreme, the privileging of canons over actual evidence 
of context can yield irrational outcomes—e.g., the soldier attacking rather 
than retreating—because it privileges hypothetical over actual evidence of 
meaning.49 Recall our story: in the first case, the soldier has evidence of the 
actual speaker’s meaning. Under Eskridge’s interpretive regime approach, 
however, if the actual evidence amounts to a canon (legislative evidence), it 
appears to have no priority in authoritativeness, and the soldier may attack 
even when the general wants him to retreat. Similarly, in the second case, the 
soldier has no actual evidence of the speaker’s meaning but has an actual 
 
47. See Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes 
and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 189 (1986). 
 48.  See id. (“The commander replies, ‘Go—’; but the rest of the message is garbled.”). 
49. Irrationality is a strong statement, but one accepted by at least some political scientists. See 
McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 
LAW. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1994, at 3, 23–25 (applying statistical decision theory to 
demonstrate that ignoring the legislative history increases the probability of judicial error). 
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experience to which he can analogize. If precedent amounts to a canon, the 
soldier is left weighing one canon telling him to attack against another telling 
him to wait—leaving our poor soldier-interpreter in no man’s land. 
We doubt that Eskridge himself would accept at least some of the 
implications from our hypothetical. First, he has been most insistent about 
the value of precedent in deciding statutory cases.50 He is at pains in 
Interpreting Law to argue that an authoritative precedent “is more 
immediately important than the ordinary meaning that today’s judge might 
have otherwise found.”51 Second, although Justice Scalia has famously 
rejected legislative evidence, dubbing it an anticanon, Eskridge rejects that 
position.52 He recognizes that “[f]or more than a century, federal judges have 
been willing to consider legislative history . . . .”53 The questions we pose 
here are not about particular interpretive resources in isolation, however. 
They are about the value of interpretive resources relative to each other. We 
worry that dubbing a wide variety of materials as canons, or as a consistent 
“interpretive regime,” can yield serious problems regarding the relative 
authority of different interpretive resources. Rather than making something 
sacred, this labeling practice may reduce the level of importance of central 
legal principles. 
To be fair, Professor Eskridge is doing nothing different than Justice 
Scalia and Bryan Garner did in Reading Law, which took general practices 
(e.g., preemption and implied rights of action) and turned them into canons 
and anticanons. Moreover, since Eskridge’s book is styled as a “primer,” the 
author may have felt it more important to leave major ordering problems to 
other work. On the other hand, this ordering problem has important 
consequences for interpreters, as the garbled order hypothetical 
demonstrates. One of the great principles of the Scalia–Garner treatise—the 
book to which Eskridge is responding—is its insistence on valid canons and 
invalid ones, the most important “invalid” one being the use of legislative 
history.54 One of us has argued, at length, that Justice Scalia’s antipathy 
toward legislative evidence is antidemocratic and ignorant.55 Here, our point 
 
50. See William N. Eskridge Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1362–64 
(1988) (arguing for an “evolutive” approach when analyzing statutory precedents). 
51. ESKRIDGE, INTERPRETING LAW, supra note 4, at 141; see also id. at 163 (discussing the 
super-strong presumption of correctness for statutory precedents). 
52. See id. at 191–204, 240–45 (recognizing that no source “has generated greater debate” than 
legislative history but, nevertheless, applying legislative evidence based on a conference committee 
report). 
53. Id. at 198. 
54. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 6, at 9, 69, 82, 341, 377–78 (listing fifty-seven valid 
canons, including the ordinary-meaning and fixed-meaning canons, and distinguishing them from 
the various pitfalls of statutory interpretation, including reliance on legislative history). 
55. See NOURSE, supra note 40, at 161–81 (arguing that “constitutional skepticism about 
legislative history is unwarranted”). Justice Scalia famously called legislative history “garbage” but 
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is different: treating legislative history as a canon makes it appear as if it is 
on par with ejusdem generis, or the whole act rule. If that is what Interpreting 
Law recommends, Eskridge may well encourage that which he would 
otherwise reject: blindness to actual evidence of Congress’s meaning, 
administrative precedents about meaning, or even a controlling judicial 
precedent on meaning, because some other canon prevails in a feverish canon 
war. 
III.   Overcanonization 
One of Interpreting Law’s most useful features is also one of its most 
nettlesome. That is, the book is a cornucopia of interpretive tools, rules, and 
maxims. It aims for thoroughness, and it admirably achieves its goal. But the 
book’s very thoroughness is also somewhat problematic, in our view. In 
reading through Interpreting Law’s exhaustive list of canons, we often found 
ourselves having the same reaction that Justice Scalia once described having 
to many of the canons in Karl Llewellyn’s famous list of “Thrusts” and 
“Parries”—i.e., “Never heard of it.”56 
This is because, in addition to listing numerous canons that are well-
established and accepted by all—e.g., the avoidance canon, ejusdem generis, 
the whole act rule—Interpreting Law labels as canons (i) methods or patterns 
of judicial reasoning that scholars have identified and even criticized but that 
none would call a canon;57 (ii) statements made by the Supreme Court in a 
few cases that are neither well-known nor well-established;58 and 
(iii) aspirational rules of interpretation that have been advocated by 
scholars.59 Moreover, it inadvertently projects a false equivalency between 
the former and the latter by neglecting in some cases to acknowledge when a 
particular canon is one that has been only infrequently invoked, lacks 
consensus, represents a method of reasoning rather than an interpretive rule, 
or is merely aspirational.60 This Part highlights a few such overcanonizations 
 
could not tell the difference between a committee report and a conference report, one of which 
happens at the beginning of the legislative process and the other at the end. See id. at 69–95 
(discussing various Supreme Court “basic” mistakes in Congress 101). 
56. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States 
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 26–27 (1997). 
57. See discussion infra subpart III(A) (describing the “Shadow Precedents Canon” and the 
“Administrability Canon”). 
58. See ESKRIDGE, INTERPRETING LAW, supra note 4, at 118–21, app. at 410, 421 (coining a 
noscitur a legibus sociis canon, a drafting manuals canon, and a lower court consensus canon); see 
also infra subpart III(B) (highlighting the “problems with turning stray Supreme Court comments 
into canons”). 
59. See ESKRIDGE, INTERPRETING LAW, supra note 4, app. at 440 (inventing U.S. Attorneys’ 
canon); id. app. at 409 (articulating a dictionary-rule caveat to the effect that “[b]y revealing variety 
in word use, dictionaries can suggest ambiguity”). 
60. See supra notes 57–59. 
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and concludes that they are problematic because labeling everything the 
Supreme Court says a canon emboldens judges to make things up as they go 
along—particularly if these canons are then allowed to trump legislative 
history and other interpretive resources. 
A.   Canons v. Patterns of Judicial Reasoning 
Part of what makes Interpreting Law so rich is that it engages deeply 
with the literature in the statutory interpretation field. Eskridge weaves 
academic commentary throughout his discussion of the canons, and this 
contributes significantly to his presentation of the advantages and 
disadvantages of particular canons. But we fear that he may go a little too far 
in this weaving. Indeed, some of the canons he lists merely restate patterns 
or practices in judicial reasoning that scholars have identified in a handful of 
cases rather than rules or legal principles that courts have regularly 
announced. 
Consider, for example, what Eskridge dubs the “Shadow Precedents 
Canon.”61 The canon derives from a series of law review articles authored by 
Deborah Widiss that expose a surprising Supreme Court practice in 
employment discrimination cases: the Court sometimes continues to reason 
from its own past precedents even after Congress has enacted legislation 
overriding those precedents.62 Widiss criticizes this practice—urging the 
Court to give full effect to Congress’s overrides and to cease reliance on 
superseded precedent cases—and suggests default interpretive rules that 
would help ameliorate this problem when it results from confusion about the 
scope of a congressional override.63 Interpreting Law turns these instances of 
judicial misinterpretation into a canon of statutory construction: “Where 
Congress has only overridden the narrow result of a precedent, but not its 
underlying doctrinal structure, that decision is still citable as a shadow 
precedent.”64 This, in our view, is not and should not be a canon for a number 
of reasons. 
First, the “shadow precedents” precept is not a rule that the Court itself 
has announced, although that deficiency perhaps could be overcome if it were 
 
61. ESKRIDGE, INTERPRETING LAW, supra note 4, at 185. 
62. Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers: Statutory 
Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 511, 513–18 (2009) 
[hereinafter Widiss, Shadow Precedents]; Deborah A. Widiss, Undermining Congressional 
Overrides: The Hydra Problem in Statutory Interpretation, 90 TEXAS L. REV. 859, 860–66 (2012) 
[hereinafter Widiss, Overrides]. 
63. See Widiss, Shadow Precedents, supra note 62, at 560–74 (discussing problems that arise 
from reliance on shadow precedents and proposing interpretive reforms). 
64. ESKRIDGE, INTERPRETING LAW, supra note 4, app. at 421. In the body of the book, the 
canon is formulated somewhat differently: “Depending on how broadly it is drafted, a statutory 
override of the precedent’s result may not negate the force of the precedent’s reasoning.” Id. at 185 
(citing Widiss, Shadow Precedents, supra note 62). 
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the only one.65 Second, and more importantly, the practice of continuing to 
rely on shadow precedents is not a well-accepted or established interpretive 
rule. Indeed, it is not really an interpretive “rule” at all but, rather, a pattern 
of judicial behavior observed in a handful of cases in one area of the law. 
Widiss herself does not describe reliance on shadow precedents as an 
“interpretive rule”; instead, she characterizes it as a “mistake”66 or as the 
result of understandable confusion about how to interpret an override 
statute.67 Transforming this practice into a canon lends it an unwarranted 
sense of legitimacy and makes it seem like a more far-reaching practice—
one that extends across statutory subject areas—than we necessarily know it 
to be. 
In a similar vein is something Eskridge calls the “Administrability 
Canon.”68 This canon draws in part on a law review article written by one of 
us69 and dictates that “an interpretation that has been shown over a period of 
time to have been easy to administer will be preferred to one that is less time-
tested and harder to administer.”70 While we certainly agree that 
administrability is an important factor that the Supreme Court regularly takes 
into account when construing statutes, we disagree with Eskridge’s effort to 
canonize it. As one of us has argued elsewhere, administrability concerns are 
a subset of practical, consequences-based reasoning, not a canon or 
interpretive rule.71 That is, when courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, 
take administrability into account in interpreting a statute, they tend to 
discuss things like the practical difficulty of implementing a particular 
interpretation, the likely effect the interpretation will have on judicial or other 
public resources, or the clarity or predictability of the legal rule established 
by the interpretation.72 These are all practical consequences that follow from 
an interpretation, and they demonstrate that judges are remarkably pragmatic 
in interpreting statutes rather than driven by mechanical rules or canons. 
 
65. See discussion infra Part IV (noting Eskridge’s failure to differentiate between “language 
canons” and “substantive canons”). 
66. See Deborah A. Widiss, Still Kickin’ After All These Years: Sutton and Toyota as Shadow 
Precedents, 63 DRAKE L. REV. 919 passim (2015) (identifying mistakes made by courts that relied 
on shadow precedents). 
67. See, e.g., Widiss, Shadow Precedents, supra note 62, at 537–38 (discussing “doctrinal 
confusion” and “lack of analytic clarity” regarding the interpretation of overrides); id. at 551 
(describing how narrow override language can lead to understandable confusion). 
68. ESKRIDGE, INTERPRETING LAW, supra note 4, at 114–17. 
69. See Anita S. Krishnakumar, The Anti-Messiness Principle in Statutory Interpretation, 87 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1465, 1469 (2012) (“[T]he anti-messiness principle reflects a judicial 
preference for simple, easy-to-administer interpretations.”). 
70. ESKRIDGE, INTERPRETING LAW, supra note 4, at 114–15. 
71. Krishnakumar, Roberts Court First Era, supra note 27, at 244–46. 
72. Id. at 244–45. 
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Trying to turn judges’ administrability-based pragmatic reasoning into a rule 
of construction thus strikes us as a bit upside down. 
Moreover, it is potentially dangerous. When we label an interpretive 
principle a canon, it inevitably becomes imbued with an aura of legitimacy. 
Canons are considered neutral legal principles, handed down over time, that 
transcend ideology and judicial policy preferences and that constrain judges. 
Despite numerous efforts to shatter this mythical vision,73 it persists in at least 
some form and is the basis for Scalia and Garner’s effort to provide a list of 
valid canons for courts to employ. In fact, we suspect it is the reason Eskridge 
himself has sought to label so many different interpretive tools as canons. But 
in so doing, Interpreting Law runs the risk of creating a new problem—i.e., 
encouraging judicial power grabs. If anything the Supreme Court says in the 
course of explaining its reasoning in a case can be called a canon, then the 
Court may freely make things up as it goes along—inventing new canons, 
announcing caveats to existing ones, and even perhaps denouncing existing 
canons as it sees fit. 
B.   Occasional Canons 
Still other canons listed in Interpreting Law appear to us to be 
aspirational, in that they set forth interpretive rules that Eskridge thinks are 
good rules but that have not necessarily been embraced by the Court. 
Oftentimes, we agree that these rules are either linguistically erudite or 
justified by attention to legislative drafting practices. Nevertheless, we worry 
that Interpreting Law has a very capacious standard for a canon—and, again, 
that this is dangerous because it encourages judges to simply make up canons 
that they think reflect good rules of thumb. 
One such example is the rule that “[f]ailure of U.S. Attorneys to initiate 
criminal prosecutions in the past is evidence that the Attorney General’s 
current reading of the statute is too broad.”74 We have not heard of such a 
canon. It appears to derive from one case, Lopez v. Gonzales,75 in which the 
Court observed that the “failure of even a single eager Assistant United States 
Attorney to act on the Government’s interpretation of [the statute]” is telling 
evidence that “belies the Government’s claim that its interpretation is the 
 
73. The most famous is Karl Llewellyn’s list of twenty-eight pairs of canons and countercanons. 
Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About 
How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401–06 (1950); see also Jonathan R. 
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Statutory Construction and Judicial Preferences, 45 
VAND. L. REV. 647, 647–48 (1992) (arguing that even if canons of construction were outcome 
determinative in every case, judges could choose to ignore them and invoke a different source of 
authority); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 
50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 805–17 (1983) (agreeing with Llewellyn that every canon has an equal and 
opposite canon and arguing further that most canons are “just plain wrong”). 
74. ESKRIDGE, INTERPRETING LAW, supra note 4, app. at 440. 
75. 549 U.S. 47 (2006). 
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more natural one.”76 This may well be a logical inference that the Court in 
future cases wishes to invoke (we express no views on the merits of the rule), 
but as used in Lopez, it seems to us more of a case-specific comment than a 
rule designed to govern the construction of all criminal statutes. 
Moreover, there are some logical and linguistic leaps between the 
Court’s inference that the government’s interpretation is not the “more 
natural one”77 and Interpreting Law’s articulation that failure to initiate 
prosecutions is proof that the government’s reading is “too broad.”78 Indeed, 
this example highlights two problems with turning stray Supreme Court 
comments into canons: (1) the approach leaves substantial room for 
idiosyncratic characterization of the interpretive rule and (2) it enables judges 
(or other would-be canonizers) to mistake what they think are good rules for 
what the Court has actually said or done in past cases. 
One might, at this point, legitimately ask: What is wrong with including 
rules a scholar thinks ought to be canons in a comprehensive list of canons? 
Treatise writers can and do push the law in new directions. Indeed, the 
Scalia–Garner volume makes similar moves—urging, for example, that 
seeking justice in an individual case is an anticanon.79 But that is precisely 
the point. Blurring the lines between established, universally accepted canons 
such as noscitur a sociis, expressio unius, the rule against superfluity, and the 
rule of lenity, on the one hand, and rules scholars think ought to be canons, 
on the other, can result in naked power grabs. Blurriness, combined with a 
lack of clear guidelines regarding what it takes for an interpretive principle 
to be considered a canon, opens the door for anyone—and judges in 
particular—to make up canons anytime they choose. Don’t like a particular 
canon? Make up an exception or limitation. Think a particular norm would 
help justify a favored interpretation of a statute? Make up a canon embodying 
that norm. 
We do not mean to suggest that Interpreting Law’s approach to canons 
is going to usher in an entirely new form of judicial overreaching. Indeed, as 
Eskridge and Frickey have highlighted, the Rehnquist Court in the 1990s 
invented several new federalism clear statement rules in just this fashion.80 
But those clear statement rules were based on constitutional norms, not 
plucked out of thin air. And, importantly, they garnered significant criticism 
 
76. Id. at 57–58. 
77. Id. at 58. 
78. ESKRIDGE, INTERPRETING LAW, supra note 4, app. at 440. 
79. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 6, at 347–48. 
80. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear 
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 597 (1992) (stating that the 
“most striking innovation” of the Rehnquist Court had been its creation of “a series of new ‘super-
strong clear statement rules’ protecting constitutional structures, especially structures associated 
with federalism”). 
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when first announced.81 If statutory interpretation theory moves to a regime 
in which we begin to call everything the Court says in the course of 
interpreting a statute a canon, then we run the risk of opening the floodgates 
and emboldening judges to invent many more such canons in the future. What 
in the 1990s struck many as a problematic judicial power grab might in the 
2020s and beyond become common judicial practice, without any 
constraining guidelines or criteria. (The problem is exacerbated, moreover, if 
and when such judicially invented canons are treated as equivalent in 
authority to legislative history or past precedents, or even used to trump such 
interpretive resources, as we noted in Part I.) 
This, of course, brings us to a series of crucial—yet unresolved—
questions in interpretation theory: What counts as a canon? From where do 
canons derive their legitimacy or authority? Does any comment made by the 
Supreme Court in a statutory interpretation case qualify? If not, how many 
times does the Court have to invoke an interpretive principle in order for it to 
become a canon? Or, on the other hand, is Supreme Court invocation the 
wrong test for what constitutes a canon? Must an interpretive principle be 
grounded in the common law, or date back to Blackstone or some other 
historical source, in order to be considered a canon? Must it accurately reflect 
how language works or how legislators draft statutes? We turn to these 
questions in the next Part. 
IV.  What Counts as a Canon? 
In the previous two Parts, we have sketched out some interpretive tools 
that, in our view, clearly should not be considered canons of statutory 
construction—e.g., other interpretive resources including legislative history, 
precedents, administrative interpretations, patterns or practices of judicial 
reasoning, and aspirational principles that scholars think should be a canon 
or are cited rarely. In this Part, we turn to the more difficult question of what 
should count as a canon and consider several positive criteria that might be 
used to evaluate potential canons. 
We begin with a threshold point. Scholars tend to think of the canons of 
statutory construction as falling into two distinct categories: language canons 
and substantive canons,82 also sometimes referred to as descriptive and 
 
81. See id. at 598 (comparing the new super-strong clear statement rules to a “‘backdoor’ 
version of the constitutional activism that most Justices on the current Court have publicly 
denounced”). 
82. For detailed explanations of this dichotomy, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., CASES 
AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC 
POLICY 643–761 (5th ed. 2014) (introducing language canons and substantive canons of 
construction); James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest 
for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 12–14 (2005) (describing the differences between 
language and substantive canons); David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory 
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normative canons.83 Language canons, as their name suggests, focus on the 
text of the statute and encompass rules of syntax and grammar, “whole act” 
rules about how different provisions of the same statute should be read in 
connection with each other (e.g., to minimize internal inconsistency, to avoid 
superfluity), and Latin maxims such as expressio unius est exclusio alterius 
and noscitur a sociis.84 Substantive canons, by contrast, are policy-based 
principles and presumptions that derive from the Constitution, common law 
practices, or normative concerns related to particular subject areas.85 
In its effort to characterize the canons as a coherent interpretive regime, 
Interpreting Law ignores important differences between these two categories 
of canons—and, indeed, compounds the problem by expanding the universe 
of canons to include other interpretive tools such as legislative history, 
precedents, and administrative interpretations. Any honest, useful attempt at 
defining what it takes for an interpretive rule to count as a canon must, in our 
view, acknowledge three salient differences between language and 
substantive canons. First, language canons are typically considered neutral or 
objective,86 whereas substantive canons are viewed as policy-based and are 
thought to add a thumb on the scales87 in favor of a particular outcome. 
 
Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 927–41 (1992) (providing an overview of the range of 
interpretative cannons from the “purely linguistic” to the “substantive”). 
83. See Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn Its 
Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561, 563 (1992) (summarizing the distinction between 
descriptive canons, which are based on particular uses of language, grammar, or syntax, and 
normative canons, which dictate that ambiguous text be construed in favor of certain judicially 
crafted policy objectives). 
84. ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., supra note 82, at 644–47, 658, 668, 674–79. The maxim expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius means the “expression . . . of one thing indicates exclusion of the other.” 
Id. at 668. The rule rests on a logical assumption of negative implication; if the legislature 
specifically enumerates certain items in a statute, this is taken to imply a deliberate exclusion of all 
other items. Id. For further explanation of the expressio unius est exclusio alterius canon, see 2A 
NORMAN J. SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 47:23 (7th ed.) [hereinafter SUTHERLAND]. Noscitur a sociis translates to “it is 
known from its associates.” Id. § 47:16. The canon dictates that when a statute contains a list of two 
or more words, courts are to give each word in the list a meaning that is consistent with the meaning 
of other words in the list. Id.; see also ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., supra note 82, at 658 (describing 
noscitur a sociis). 
85. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., supra note 82, at 643 (asserting that substantive canons 
usually “derive from policy positions articulated by courts”). 
86. That these are in fact “neutral” is not necessarily true. For example, one of us has argued 
that each of the Latin canons can be paired with another Latin canon to come out with different 
results. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., ABBE R. GLUCK & VICTORIA F. NOURSE, STATUTES, 
REGULATION, AND INTERPRETATION: LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF 
STATUTES 91–93 (Supp. 2017) (noting that Latin canons have faced criticism for leading to counter 
canons). Similarly, linguists are not necessarily so sanguine about their neutrality. See LAWRENCE 
M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES 29 (1993) (noting that conflicting principles of 
interpretation have created a body of “mutually inconsistent legal rules,” enabling lawyers and 
judges to use them to support almost any position they choose). 
87. See Scalia, supra note 56, at 29 (“Some of the rules, perhaps, can be considered merely an 
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Second, and related to the first, the two sets of canons derive their authority 
and legitimacy from different sources: language canons are thought to reflect 
rules of grammar, logic, sentence organization, or even congressional 
drafting; substantive canons are thought to reflect background norms 
established in the Constitution, the common law, or some other element of 
the legal system.88 Third, at the U.S. Supreme Court level at least, language 
canons are used far more frequently than substantive canons,89 although 
substantive canons tend to bear the brunt of scholarly criticism. 
It strikes us that to be considered a canon, an interpretive rule must be 
well-established in the legal community. That is, judges and lawyers must be 
familiar with it. Moreover, a canon must derive from an authoritative source; 
it cannot simply be a rule that a party suggests or makes up in its brief. 
Beginning from that premise, we consider four potential tests or measures 
that might be used to determine whether a particular interpretive rule counts 
as a canon: (1) the frequency with which the rule has been invoked by the 
U.S. Supreme Court; (2) the rule’s longevity (i.e., when it was announced or 
how long it has been in place, and whether it has been adopted across 
different iterations or generations of the Supreme Court); (3) the justification 
for the rule; and (4) whether the Court definitively declared or announced the 
rule as one of general applicability (as opposed to treating it as a case-specific 
interpretive argument). 
 
1.  Frequency of Invocation.—One sign that an interpretive rule is well-
established and even ingrained in the legal community is that it is invoked 
frequently, or at least regularly and consistently, over time in legal discourse. 
The number or frequency of citations to a rule or other legal source often is 
used as a proxy for its status in the legal community. In previous work on 
canonical dissents, for example, one of us has used the number of favorable 
citations to a dissenting opinion made by subsequent Supreme Court majority 
opinions, combined with the overruling of the original decision, as the 
measure for whether the dissenting opinion has been canonized.90 Aaron-
Andrew Bruhl similarly has compared the rate at which lower federal courts 
invoke particular linguistic canons and legislative history with the rate at 
 
exaggerated statement of what normal, no-thumb-on-the-scales interpretation would produce 
anyway.” (emphasis added)). 
88. See sources cited supra notes 82–83 (discussing generally various language and substantive 
canons of construction). 
89. See, e.g., Krishnakumar, Reconsidering, supra note 27, at 849–50 (reporting, in Tables 1 
and 2, relative rates of the Roberts Court’s references to language versus substantive canons); 
Mendelson, supra note 29, app. at 101 (tracking rates of engagement for all canons—both textual 
and substantive). 
90. See Anita S. Krishnakumar, On the Evolution of the Canonical Dissent, 52 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 781, 784 n.11 (2000) (describing her methodology). 
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which the Supreme Court invokes those same linguistic canons and 
legislative history; he has suggested that the comparison be used as a proxy 
for how closely lower federal courts follow the Supreme Court’s lead in 
embracing or rejecting particular interpretive tools.91 And in a recent study 
that traces the evolution of several prominent substantive canons, Judge Amy 
Coney Barrett has argued that canons do not become “deeply entrenched” the 
moment they are announced by the Supreme Court but only after subsequent 
cases begin to invoke them regularly.92 
Frequency of citation is an admittedly imperfect measure of canonical 
status. It is not necessarily the case, for example, that the most frequently 
invoked interpretive rule is also the most universally accepted. Nevertheless, 
frequency of judicial invocation does capture an important aspect of what it 
means to be well-established and entrenched in the legal community. That 
said, a couple of questions remain. First, which judicial forum should be used 
to measure frequency of use—the U.S. Supreme Court, all federal courts, 
federal courts of appeals, or state courts? Most commentators have taken for 
granted that citation by the U.S. Supreme Court should be the yardstick by 
which frequency of use of a particular canon is measured.93 We agree for 
several reasons. First, there is some evidence that lower courts tend to follow 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s lead with respect to whether a particular canon is 
 
91. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Communicating the Canons: How Lower Courts React when the 
Supreme Court Changes the Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 100 MINN. L. REV. 481, 496–502 
(2015). 
92. See Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 109, 
138, 140–43, 151–52 (2010) (concluding that the “Charming Betsy” canon, articulated in 1804, was 
absent from the case law for the next century and did not become entrenched until the 1950s; noting 
that the avoidance canon was first clearly articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1830s but 
took several decades to become “a fixture in both case law and commentary”; observing that the 
“Indian canon” was articulated in an 1832 case but “lay dormant” for thirty-four years and that, 
given the “paucity of nineteenth century cases applying the canon,” it could not be called a “well-
settled law” until much later). In a different but related context, Richard Posner has used the number 
of citations to a scholarly work as “an index to the influence, and less confidently to the quality, of 
the paper.” Richard A. Posner, The Learned Hand Biography and the Question of Judicial 
Greatness, 104 YALE L.J. 511 app. at 534 (1994) (book review). 
93. See, e.g., FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
99–101 (2009) (examining the Supreme Court’s use of canons); ESKRIDGE, INTERPRETING LAW, 
supra note 4, passim (referring to the Supreme Court’s use of various canons); ESKRIDGE JR. ET 
AL., supra note 82, app. B (listing canons invoked by the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts); Barrett, 
supra note 92, at 128–54 (tracing the history of substantive canons); Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 
82, at 29–33 (reporting the Court’s reliance on different interpretive resources); Krishnakumar, 
Reconsidering, supra note 27, at 847–50 (reporting the frequency with which Justices on the Roberts 
Court referenced canons); Krishnakumar, Roberts Court First Era, supra note 27, at 221–24 
(examining the Roberts Court’s reliance on canons in statutory cases); Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use 
of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis, 70 TEXAS L. REV. 1073, 1075–76 
(1992) (analyzing the Supreme Court’s use of authority in statutory cases). But see CROSS, supra, 
at 180–200 (examining use of canons and other interpretive resources by federal courts of appeals). 
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in or out of favor.94 Second, the Supreme Court is the highest court in the 
land, so it is difficult to envision it following the lead of lower courts or state 
courts if such courts were to articulate a new canon or begin to employ an old 
one frequently. Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court has the greatest visibility 
of any court in the country. Lawyers and judges in Oregon or Chicago may 
pay close attention to what the Oregon Supreme Court or the Seventh Circuit 
decide, but those living and practicing in other states may not. Last, given 
recent evidence that several state courts have fashioned their own unique 
interpretive regimes—which sometimes deviate significantly from the 
approach taken by the U.S. Supreme Court—it seems prudent to avoid state 
courts’ potentially idiosyncratic pronouncements as the benchmark for 
determining which interpretive rules have become entrenched in the broader 
legal community.95 
The next question then becomes: What suffices to constitute frequent 
use by the U.S. Supreme Court? Any numerical threshold will be inherently 
arbitrary. If we were to set a floor somewhere in the ballpark of seven to ten 
citations in U.S. Supreme Court opinions since 1790, when the first iteration 
of the Court began deciding cases,96 this would capture most canons that 
scholars and judges are familiar with and then some. It would eliminate some 
of the canons listed in Interpreting Law’s appendix—but that is appropriate 
because some of the listed rules are not, in our view, canons but rather other 
interpretive resources, and others have been cited only sparingly.97 In any 
event, we do not mean for this number to be set in stone but merely suggest 
it as a starting point for discussion. Perhaps the ideal number should be lower 
for canons that are subject-matter specific—e.g., those calling for liberal 
construction of the Freedom of Information Act98 or interpreting the Sherman 
Act to benefit consumers99—but should be at the higher end of the spectrum 
for generally applicable rules such as the maxim that a “precisely drawn, 
 
94. Bruhl, supra note 91, at 496–503. 
95. See Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological 
Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1778, 1805–06 (2010) 
(describing approaches adopted by several state supreme courts). 
96. The U.S. Supreme Court began its first sittings on February 2, 1790.  BERNARD SCHWARTZ, 
A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 18 (1993). 
97. Notably, several of the canons listed individually in Interpreting Law are narrower 
applications or formulations of a broader canon that is well-established (and that has been cited at 
least seven times by the Supreme Court). In such cases, even if the narrow application is not 
referenced the minimum number of times required to count as a canon on its own, it should be 
considered a subset of the broader canon. For example, the appendix lists a rule stating that 
“[a]mbiguities or uncertainties in criminal laws referenced in immigration statutes should be 
resolved in favor of noncitizens.” See ESKRIDGE, INTERPRETING LAW, supra note 4, app. at 442. 
This strikes us as a narrow application, or subset, of both the rule of lenity and the immigration-
law-specific rule that ambiguities should be resolved in favor of the alien. 
98. Id. app. at 441. 
99. Id. app. at 436. 
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detailed statute preempts or governs a more general statute.”100 In the end, 
the exact number of minimum citations is not what matters most; the 
minimum threshold should merely be a vehicle for ensuring that loose 
judicial commentary is not labeled a canon on the basis of one or two (or 
even three) stray utterances by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
 
2.  Longevity or Historical Pedigree.—How long an interpretive rule 
has been in effect may be one of the most important factors in determining 
whether it qualifies as a canon of statutory construction. When an interpretive 
rule has been around for a while, it is likely to be familiar to members of the 
legal community. It also is more likely to be cited or quoted in cases and to 
be listed in treatises. Latin maxims such as expressio unius and ejusdem 
generis, for example, seem to derive much of their authority from the mere 
fact that they have been on the books for a long time. And Justice Scalia 
famously once commented that the rule of lenity “is validated by sheer 
antiquity.”101 
Perhaps just as importantly, the law is inherently backward-looking and 
preoccupied with continuity, consistency, and predictability. That is why 
courts look to the common law to fill in gaps left in statutes102 and why 
Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England103 are so widely cited by 
American courts even in the modern era.104  In short, the longer a rule has 
been on the books, the more comfortable we are with it and the more we tend 
to trust that it must be a good rule—otherwise, how would it have endured? 
One of us has elsewhere called this an assumption of “soundness” and has 
noted its connection to the Burkean philosophical preference for tradition and 
longstanding understandings that pervades much of the American political 
and legal system.105 
But Burkeanism and rule of law preferences for consistency and 
predictability aside, we are hesitant to treat longevity as a requirement—
 
100. Id. app. at 435. 
101. Scalia, supra note 56, at 29; see also Barrett, supra note 92, at 129–34 (calling lenity “an 
entrenched part of the English approach to statutory interpretation” and tracing its early adoption 
by American courts). 
102. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1007, 1051 (1989) (explaining that courts use common law rules to fill in gaps in statutes 
because the common law offers a “readily accessible body of rules” that private parties already are 
familiar with and are accustomed to following). 
103. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1st ed. 1765). 
104. A quick word search in Westlaw (Blackstone! /s comment!), for example, found 433 U.S. 
Supreme Court references to the Commentaries—356 of them made in 1902 or later. 
105. See Anita S. Krishnakumar, Longstanding Agency Interpretations, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1823, 1849–50 (2015) (citing EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 
AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN (Dolphin ed. 1961) (1790)) (maintaining that an interpretation’s survival 
for a long period of time is evidence that it is sound, which is consistent with the Burkean preference 
for longstanding understandings). 
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rather than merely an indicator—that an interpretive rule should be 
considered a canon. It is one thing to recognize longevity and consistency as 
signs that a rule is well-established; it is quite another to insist on longevity, 
perhaps in the form of a minimum number of years on the books, before a 
rule may be considered a canon. Indeed, such an approach would bar the 
recognition of “new” canons, such as the federalism clear statement rules that 
cropped up largely out of the blue and in quick succession during the 1980s–
1990s.106 Moreover, it would entrench old rules that the Court no longer uses 
simply because they were adopted in the Blackstone era or were uttered once 
by the Supreme Court and then forgotten. Such concerns lead us to the 
conclusion that while longevity may act as an important “plus” factor in 
helping to determine whether a particular interpretive rule qualifies as a 
canon, it should not be used as a dispositive measure that all canons must 
meet. 
In other words, we believe that while longevity can lend weight to an 
interpretive rule’s claim to canonical status, it is not sufficient by itself to 
justify such status. In order for an interpretive rule to qualify as a canon, 
regular Supreme Court use also seems necessary. If the rule was invoked 
fleetingly—once or a few times during the nation’s early years—but never 
used regularly, then it should not be considered a canon. By contrast, if such 
use was frequent but then fell off over time, the canon should continue to be 
considered a canon, barring express later rejection by the Court. One 
corrective for the “fleeting” canon problem would be to consider not only 
longevity in the abstract but consistent usage across different courts. If an 
interpretive rule was employed by both the Peckham and Warren Courts, for 
example, it should have greater warrant to be dubbed a canon than a rule 
whose use is limited to a single Supreme Court generation. Just as we view 
certain cases107 as canonical because they have survived over long periods 
and have been cited in diverse situations by diverse judges, canon status for 
interpretive rules should require similar indicia. 
 
3.  Justification.—A third factor that might be used to measure whether 
an interpretive rule should be considered a canon is the basis or justification 
for the rule. There are, unfortunately, a variety of theories and justifications 
of canons. Some canons, for example, have been justified on the theory that 
they accurately reflect how Congress drafts statutes or how ordinary people 
 
106. See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 80, at 597 (calling the Court’s creation of these 
clear statement canons a “most striking innovation”). 
107. E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 
(1963); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 
(1803). 
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use language,108 or that they promote coherence throughout the U.S. Code.109 
Others have been said to derive their authority from the Constitution or 
established background norms pervading our legal system.110 Further, some 
scholars, including Eskridge, have argued that the canons reflect principles 
basic to all communication.111 
It is worth asking, then, whether grounding in one of these justifications 
is necessary for an interpretive rule to be considered a canon. That is, must a 
language canon do one of the following in order to qualify: reflect legislative 
drafting practices, reflect rules of grammar and logic that ordinary people 
use, or promote coherence across the U.S. Code? Must a substantive canon 
promote constitutional values or at least be grounded in some fundamental 
tenet of the American legal system? 
In theory, one would want something more than mere age and usage to 
solidify a canon’s legitimacy. But even the most plausible theories of canons 
have not fared well under scrutiny. Consider the theory that canons reflect 
how Congress drafts or how reasonable people use language. Recent 
 
108. See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(arguing that the meaning of a statute’s terms ought to be based on what is “most in accord with 
context and ordinary usage, and thus most likely to have been understood by the whole Congress 
which voted on the words of the statute”); James J. Brudney, Canon Shortfalls and the Virtues of 
Political Branch Interpretive Assets, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1199, 1203 (2010) [hereinafter Brudney, 
Canon Shortfalls] (describing the theory held by some that judicial reliance on conventional usage 
when construing a statute’s terms “promote[s] greater predictability in statutory interpretation”); 
Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 82, at 12 (explaining that language canons aim to give effect to the 
plain meaning of the legislature’s language, “which in turn is understood to promote the actual or 
constructive intent of the legislature that enacted such language”); William W. Buzbee, The One-
Congress Fiction in Statutory Interpretation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 171, 226 (2000) (discussing Justice 
Scalia’s views about the judicial obligation to impose coherence on the U.S. Code); Elizabeth 
Garrett, Attention to Context in Statutory Interpretation: Applying the Lessons of Dynamic Statutory 
Interpretation to Omnibus Legislation, ISSUES LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, Nov. 2002, art. 1, at 7 
(describing how Congress drafts statutes knowing that they will be interpreted according to certain 
norms and default rules); Scalia, supra note 56, at 16 (discussing tension between applying the plain 
meaning of a statute and attempting to give effect to the legislature’s intent). 
109. See, e.g., Bock Laundry, 490 U.S. at 528 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The meaning of terms 
on the statute books ought to be determined . . . on the basis of which meaning is . . . most 
compatible with the surrounding body of law into which the provision must be integrated . . . .”); 
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 6, at 252–53 (describing how words or phrases in a statute should 
be construed not to clash with other provisions of that statute). 
110. See, e.g., Brudney, Canon Shortfalls, supra note 108, at 1205 (explaining Frickey’s view 
that legal interpretation does not rely on conventional usage or ordinary meaning and emphasizing 
Frickey’s references to “evolving circumstances and extrinsic public-law values”); John F. 
Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 125 (2001) (explaining 
the textualists’ practice of “reading statutes in light of established background conventions”); Scalia, 
supra note 56, at 29 (defending the rule of lenity and rules requiring a clear statement to eliminate 
state sovereignty or to waive the federal government’s sovereign immunity). 
111. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, INTERPRETING LAW, supra note 4, at 52–53 (explaining that 
conversations and statutory interpretation both operate under a cooperative principle); Geoffrey P. 
Miller, Pragmatics and the Maxims of Interpretation, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1179, 1220 (describing 
how certain canons are recognizable in everyday conversational settings). 
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empirical studies have shown that, in some cases, the canons actually 
contradict congressional staffers’ descriptions of common legislative drafting 
practices. For example, the well-established rule against superfluity dictates 
that statutes should be construed to avoid redundancy, so that when there are 
two overlapping terms, each should be construed to have an independent 
meaning.112 Interviews with congressional staffers, however, reveal that they 
sometimes deliberately err on the side of redundancy in order to “capture the 
universe,” ensure coverage of key items, or satisfy particular legislators, 
constituents, or lobbyists who “want[] to see that word” included.113 
Similarly, the expressio unius canon, which instructs that the inclusion of one 
statutory term implies the intentional exclusion of another,114 has many 
logical imperfections—most notably, that the legislator simply may not have 
contemplated the particular application at issue.115 Yet there can be little 
doubt by any measure—frequency of use, longevity, or historical pedigree—
that it is a canon.116 And it is a canon even if there is no consensus among 
linguists that it is necessary to, or an accurate reflection of, everyday 
communication.117 
Or consider the theory that canons should be grounded in a 
constitutional principle (which in theory would eliminate the language 
canons). On the one hand, the most commonly invoked substantive canons—
e.g., avoidance, the rule of lenity, federalism clear statement rules, sovereign 
immunity waivers, preemption, and the presumption of nonretroactivity—are 
 
112. See, e.g., Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 146 (1995) (“We assume that Congress 
used two terms because it intended each term to have a particular, nonsuperfluous meaning.”). 
113. Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An 
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 
901, 934 (2013). 
114. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 80–81 (2002) (declining to apply 
the expressio unius canon where other reasons existed for exclusion of a statutory term). 
115. See Nat’l Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (noting 
that the canon “stands on the faulty premise that all possible alternative or supplemental provisions 
were necessarily considered and rejected by the [legislature]”); SUTHERLAND, supra note 84, 
§ 47:25 (discussing the limitations of the canon). 
116. The canon appears to have first been referenced by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1806. See 
United States v. Grundy & Thornburgh, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 337, 353, 356d (1806) (referencing a 
lower court opinion employing the maxim “[e]xpressio unius est exclusio alterius”). Since then, it 
has been cited in at least another 130 cases. (A Westlaw search for “expressio unius” turned up 131 
cases total.) 
117. Geoffrey Miller wrote a fascinating article suggesting that the canons could be justified 
under Paul Grice’s theory of conversational cooperation. Miller, supra note 111, at 1191–92. 
Grice’s theory of cooperation, however, is quite controversial. Moreover, there is a significant 
question whether it applies in environments—within Congress or between Congress and courts—
in which speakers have incentives not to cooperate. Similarly, David Shapiro has written a 
deservedly famous defense of the canons as favoring continuity as opposed to change. Shapiro, 
supra note 82. Eskridge cites Shapiro favorably, but one must wonder how “new” or 
“unconventional” canons preserve continuity. 
 
KRISHNAKUMAR.PRINTING (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2018  8:08 PM 
188 Texas Law Review [Vol. 97:163 
 
all connected to or based upon constitutional principles.118 At the same time, 
however, the Constitution has nothing to say on many subjects that statutes 
regulate—including, for example, antitrust rules, relations with Indian tribes, 
and veterans’ benefits—yet we have numerous longstanding and frequently 
invoked canons about how to read antitrust, Indian-tribal, and veterans’ 
benefits statutes, among others.119 
Thus, what counts as a canon must be about more—or perhaps, less—
than accuracy regarding how words are used or a connection to a 
constitutional provision. In our view, the basic thread connecting the canons 
is (or should be) established convention. Longevity or historical pedigree, 
and perhaps a connection to the Constitution, can help demonstrate 
established convention, but for the reasons we have outlined above, the real, 
indispensable measure for such convention must be regular Supreme Court 
use across ideological divides. Usage is important because canons claim their 
status as authoritative not simply based on age but because they represent 
how a “language community” understands and uses terms.120 It is not that 
these are rules every citizen must or does speak, but that they are terms 
lawyers learn to speak. As the canons’ most sophisticated supporters suggest, 
they are the lingua franca of the law.121 
Basic communication, however, requires agreement to cooperate, as 
philosophers of language know quite well. Paul Grice famously wrote that a 
“Cooperative Principle” governs communication.122 Canons that are 
ideologically divisive are not canons; they are not established as rules 
 
118. See Krishnakumar, Reconsidering, supra note 27, at 856, 901–08 (reporting results of an 
empirical study finding that the vast majority of substantive canons invoked by the Roberts Court 
fell into one of these six categories). 
119. These include, but are not limited to, canons instructing that the Sherman Act should be 
construed in light of its overall purpose of benefitting consumers; that Indian tribes cannot be sued 
without explicit congressional authorization; that veterans’ benefits statutes must be construed 
liberally for their beneficiaries; and that a presumption against the national “diminishment” of 
Indian lands exists. See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2030 (2014) (invoking 
the principle that tribal sovereignty and immunity from suit can only be abridged through 
Congressional action); Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 440–41 (2011) 
(holding that the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act should be “construed in the beneficiaries’ favor,” 
absent “clear indication” otherwise); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 
549 U.S. 312, 317, 319 (2007) (explaining that the Court has not permitted “recovery for above-
cost price cutting” under the Sherman Act because it could chill “legitimate price cutting,” which 
benefits consumers); Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 411 (1994) (acknowledging that in diminishment 
cases, statutory ambiguities are resolved “in favor of the Indians”). 
120. See John F. Manning, Continuity and the Legislative Design, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1863, 1863 (2004) (“[P]roponents now emphasize that much like any other interpretive practice, a 
canon’s utility will depend on the interpreter’s capacity, at times, to identify how members of a 
linguistic community would ordinarily use that canon in context.”). 
121. Id. at 1863, 1869–70. 
122. For a detailed explanation of this feature of discourse, see PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE 
WAY OF WORDS 22–40 (1989). 
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accepted by the linguistic community. They do not follow the most basic 
notion of cooperation. It is well to remember that canons hail to ancient 
Roman practice (it is called “canon law” after all). Emperor Theodosius was 
famous for uniting warring religious sects. The “compromise” was one of the 
most important in all Christendom: the Nicene Creed is perhaps the most 
famous example of religious canons as well as one of enduring 
compromise.123 This example simply reflects what positive political theorists 
tell us—that the idea of “compromise” is essential to any regime’s stability.124 
Thus, in our view, the ultimate test of a canon is one that reflects the stability 
of compromise, by which we mean that the canon reflects the agreement of 
Supreme Court Justices appointed by different parties and across ideological 
divides. 
 
4.  Can Canons Be Undeclared?—Last, it is worth considering whether 
an interpretive rule can qualify as a canon only if the Supreme Court itself 
has consciously declared or understood itself to be adopting a canon (or 
generally applicable legal rule) as opposed to merely making a comment 
about its reasoning in the particular case in front of it. A “conscious 
declaration” requirement has the advantage of ruling out off-handed 
comments made by the Court that are case-specific—such as the so-called 
canon that U.S. Attorneys’ failure to advance a particular reading of a 
criminal statute is strong evidence that the reading is incorrect.125 It also 
would make it much harder for anyone other than the members of the Court 
to identify or designate particular interpretive rules as canons. Depending on 
one’s perspective, this could be either a positive or a negative feature. 
On the one hand, if regular Supreme Court use is the most sensible 
measure of a rule’s status as a canon, then it may make a lot of sense to limit 
the ability to “declare” a canon to the Court. On the other hand, doing so risks 
 
123. CHARLES FREEMAN, A.D. 381: HERETICS, PAGANS, AND THE DAWN OF THE 
MONOTHEISTIC STATE 129 (2009) (“Theodosius . . . had provided the legal framework within 
which Christianity had been given dominance over paganism and the Nicene Creed precedence 
within Christianity.”); see id. at 101–03 (observing that Theodosius demanded that the sects reach 
agreement over “intractable philosophical problems” and by law “silenced the debate”); id. at 35 
(“[I]t was not until the fourth century that the texts included in the New Testament were [finalized] 
as a canon . . . .”). 
124. See Tonja Jacobi, Sonia Mittal & Barry R. Weingast, Creating a Self-Stabilizing 
Constitution: The Role of the Takings Clause, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 601, 626 (2015) (concluding that 
compromises historically “resolve[] the immediate issue of the crisis” and “set rules governing 
future policies”). See generally Barry R. Weingast, Political Stability and Civil War: Institutions, 
Commitment, and American Democracy (discussing the interplay of the balance rule, representative 
democracy, and federalism), in ANALYTIC NARRATIVES 148 (Robert Bates ed. 1998). 
125. See Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 57–58 (2006) (“[T]he failure of even a single eager 
Assistant United States Attorney to act on the Government’s interpretation of ‘felony punishable 
under the [CSA]’ in the very context in which that phrase appears in the United States Code belies 
the Government’s claim that its interpretation is the more natural one.”). 
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missing at least some of the Court’s gradual, perhaps understated, 
articulations of new canons. Not all canons are intended as such the moment 
they are uttered. Even if they are, the Court might not clearly declare them as 
canons, focusing instead on the application of the canon to the interpretive 
issue before it in the particular case. Indeed, the Court sometimes announces 
a rule or principle in one case with little thought about whether it will make 
sense in other cases, only to later confront a similar case in which the rule is 
useful and to invoke it in the second case as well. If the Court proceeds in 
this manner for several more cases, it becomes hard to argue that the rule is 
not a canon, even if the Court itself has never openly declared it one.126 
Accordingly, we would recommend that the nature and frequency of the 
Supreme Court’s reliance on an interpretive rule—rather than the act of 
openly declaring the rule to be a broadly applicable one—should drive the 
analysis of whether the rule rises to the level of an established canon of 
statutory construction. 
In short, we reject the notion that any and all norms can count as a canon. 
We also reject the notion that only textually authoritative canons should 
count. The former is too broad and the latter too narrow. Instead, canon status 
should be awarded only to interpretive rules that are well-established in the 
legal community and that reflect what we call “the stability of compromise.” 
 
126. A good example is the relatively new “elephants in mouseholes” canon, first articulated in 
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Associations, 531 U.S. 457 (2001). See id.at 468 (“Congress, we have 
held, does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary 
provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”).  Since Am. Trucking, the 
Court has referenced the “elephants in mouseholes” concept in thirteen subsequent cases. See Epic 
Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1627 (2018); Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver County Employees Ret. 
Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061, 1071 (2018); Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 984 (2017); 
Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1947 (2016); Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2796 (2014); E.P.A. v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 572 
U.S. 489, 528 (2014); Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 640—41 (2011); 
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 645 (2010); Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 
557 U.S. 261, 303 (2009); Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 239 (2009); Ali v. Fed. 
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(2008); Gonzalez v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 267 (2006). None of these cases has characterized the 
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language observation.”  Ali, 552 U.S. 214 at 247. Nevertheless, many scholars and lower courts 
consider the “elephants in mouseholes” principle to be a canon.  See, e.g., Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, 
Communicating the Canons: How Lower Courts React when the Supreme Court Changes the Rules 
of Statutory Interpretation, 100 MINN. L. REV. 481, 542 (2015) (“The ‘no elephants in mouseholes’ 
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Interpretation: Interpretive Canon Use in the Roberts Court’s First Decade, 117 MICH. L. REV. 71, 
104 (2018) (referring to the “new ‘no elephants in mouseholes’ canon”); Michael Coenen & Seth 
Davis, Minor Courts, Major Questions, 70 VAND. L. REV. 777, 787 (2017); Si Min Cen v. Attorney 
Gen., 825 F.3d 177, 194 (3d Cir. 2016); Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. E.P.A., No. 09-
1322, 2012 WL 6621785, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 20, 2012); United States v. Franck’s Lab, Inc., 816 
F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1237 (M.D. Fla. 2011), order vacated, appeal dismissed, No. 11-15350, 2012 WL 
10234948 (11th Cir. Oct. 18, 2012). 
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* * * 
We end this Review where we began, by comparing Interpreting Law 
to Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner’s Reading Law on the question, “What 
counts as a canon?” Under the test we have recommended in this Part⎯the 
nature, frequency, and stability of the Supreme Court’s use of an interpretive 
rule⎯Interpreting Law’s list of canons is a bit too long, and Justice Scalia 
and Bryan Garner’s list is quite a bit too short. Where Eskridge includes some 
interpretive rules that are not widely enough established to merit canonical 
status, Scalia and Garner exclude from the metacanon numerous interpretive 
rules that are widely established. In our view, Eskridge’s overinclusion is 
less troublesome because he is open about where the rules he lists derive 
from, citing cases to support each canon he identifies and citing the scholarly 
work from which he draws recommended canons. By contrast, Justice Scalia 
and Bryan Garner offer little justification, beyond the authors’ opinions, for 
expelling numerous established interpretive tools from the list of canons (or 
turning them into anticanons). Sins of omission may be more troublesome 
than overinclusion as readers unaware of the larger universe may reach 
inappropriate conclusions. 
Conclusion 
There is every reason to believe that the “canon wars” are likely to 
continue in the Supreme Court and in the legal literature. Theories of 
interpretation have been relentlessly moving toward textualism, and, with 
that move, interpreters have attempted to fill gaps with standard canonical 
practice, claiming that our “law of interpretation,” including our 
constitutional law, depends upon canons.127 Such claims, however, leave 
unresolved the central question raised by both Eskridge’s Interpreting Law 
and Scalia and Garner’s Reading Law—What counts as a canon of 
construction? While we cannot hope to have answered that question 
definitively in this short Review, we have aspired to at least outline and 
evaluate some potential measures of canonical status. Others, we hope, will 
continue that conversation. 
 
 
 
127. See Baude & Sachs, supra note 3, at 1088–89 (discussing canons as part of the “law of 
interpretation”). 
